

**ELECTION
FRAUD**

PRIMARY
DOCUMENTS

MAIL-IN VOTE MANIPULATION AND
OTHER FRAUD AND OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH KOREA'S
APRIL 15, 2020 ELECTION

Park Ju-Hyun

Synopsis for “Mail-in Vote Manipulation and Other Fraud and Outside Interference in South Korea’s April 15, 2020 Election”

Attorney Park’s paper offers a detailed assessment of clear and large-scale irregularities involving ‘mail-in’ votes cast during the South Korean election’s two-days of ‘early voting. Attorney Park’s research highlights the importance of exposing the vulnerability and danger posed by the existing scheme for handling ‘mail-in’ ballots. According to Attorney Park’s assessment, upwards of 1 million votes cast in the April 15th, 2020 election were of questionable provenance and potentially fraudulent.

The paper also lays out allegations of efforts by the incumbent Moon administration to interfere with the electoral process by clamping down on dissent and muzzling freedom of speech of South Korean citizens, and also using the COVID-19 pandemic as cover for such efforts. Attorney Park also addresses in some detail allegations of foreign (Chinese) manipulation and interference in the South Korean general election held on April 15, 2020, to include allegations of vulnerable Chinese-made technology in the South Korean election network, and allegedly introduced and utilized without proper oversight or transparency.

The paper concludes by highlighting the efforts of South Korean citizens to expose and seek redress for alleged election fraud. The activities of a citizens group led by former National Assemblyman Min Kyung-Wook, get particular notice, as do claims that the incumbent Moon Jae-in administration is attempting to hinder and block such effort of citizens seeking to raise alleged electoral irregularities to public examination.

As a final plea, Attorney Park requests the international community to help address the irregularities exposed during the April 15, 2020 national assembly election.

Mail-in Vote Manipulation and Other Fraud and Outside Interference in South Korea's April 15, 2020 Election

Attorney Park Ju-hyun

1. Unprecedented challenges facing South Korea's democracy offer a context for understanding the April 15, 2020 election and reactions to its outcome

South Korea's 19th President Moon Jae-in said he would "create a country that we have never experienced before" in his inaugural speech. In 2020, South Korea has become a country that its citizens should never experience again and never want to experience again.

Cho Kuk, Choo Mi-ae, Yoon Mi-hyang, Son Hye-won, Yoo Jae-soo, huge corruption scandals like Lime Asset Management-Optimus Asset Management, politicization of disease control, recession, tax hikes, rise in foreign debt, unemployment rate increases and incompetence in governance, including the disappearance of diplomacy. South Korean citizens criticize President Moon and the ruling party whenever they gather together. According to opinion polls conducted on the streets and subway stations, Moon's approval rating was very low.

Regardless of these circumstances, the ruling party took 180 seats, or 60 percent, of the 300 total seats of the National Assembly in the recent April 15 general election, which is a result that many find hard to believe. According to public opinion polls conducted after he took office, his approval rating has never fallen below 41.08 percent, which was the percentage he received in the presidential election. In his fourth year in office, it was found that there were many who accessed the petition page run by the Blue House through IP addresses from China. So-called "Chinagate" became a big issue. This refers to Chinese and ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality (Joseonjok) manipulating public opinion using major internet portal service providers like Naver and Daum. A local lawyers' association filed a lawsuit regarding Chinagate over obstruction of business, but the investigation never took off.

Meanwhile, a day after the April 15 election, statistics and data analyzing the election became available right away on a website called "Wuhan Gallery." There was a clear difference in results for early voting depending on whether it was "Inside Jurisdiction," which is for those who vote in their registered district, or "Outside Jurisdiction," for those who cast their ballots at a polling station outside of their registered district. For early voting in the Seoul metropolitan areas, the count for the ruling Democratic Party (DP) was 63 percent and the opposition Liberty Korea Party (LKP) received 36 percent of the vote. There also was a certain ratio between mail-in voting and the Inside Jurisdiction early voting. Additionally, Lee Geun-hyung, a chief policy analyst at the DP, predicted the election results ahead of time. These were the reasons why people became suspicious about election fraud. There were a total of 125 lawsuits filed with courts requesting the invalidation of the election. During the process of requesting the preservation of evidence, ripped-off seal stickers and ballot boxes, illegal ballot boxes such as bread boxes used to store ballots and bunches of ballot papers that were never folded and looked like new dollar bills were found. It has been five months since the lawsuits were filed requesting the preservation of evidence. However, the government still hasn't provided the integrated voter list to the public. During the video analysis of the ballot counting process, multiple cases were

discovered where ballot papers with ballot 2 (the opposition party) selected or marked as invalid suddenly change to having ballot 1 (the ruling party) selected. There also was a case where the machine read 1,810 votes as 1,680 votes. There was even a case where ballot papers were stuck to each other as well as papers with different sizes. We found out that Chinese nationals participated in the election as polling workers and multiple districts had more votes cast than the actual number of voters. It was also discovered that 1.1 million votes out of the 2.72 million mail-in votes were manipulated. It normally takes about three months for the court to finish the cases and recount the votes. However, the court has not even set the first date for hearing arguments for a recount this time under the Supreme Court. The court’s Chief Justice Kim Myung-soo was appointed by Moon Jae-in. The press is blocking reports of election fraud. There are other things happening that are not normal, like editors not allowing journalists to report on the issue.

A. Korea, where freedom of expression and assembly has disappeared

The Moon Jae-in administration is on the brink due to the failure of his policies on real estate, the economy and national security, incompetence in diplomacy, corruption and the recently revealed election fraud, as well as his submissive posture toward the communist regimes in North Korea and China. The anger among citizens is growing, but the Moon administration is now banning all rallies from being held, citing the danger of infection and transmission of Covid-19. It is putting in every effort to block people from gathering together. As the Moon administration persecutes those who are holding rallies, there are vehicles and bicycles traveling around the country with signs saying “Execute those involved in the April 15 Election Fraud” and “Release the Integrated Voter List.” There also are buses called “Truth Buses” traveling around the country with the signs saying “At least a million mail-in votes were manipulated,” “Use of QR codes is against election law,” “Why are ballot papers in a bread company’s bread boxes?,” “Ghost votes, more votes than the number of voters,” “China is behind Chinagate and the election fraud” and “April 15 election fraud, the 21st general election was rigged.”

[Truth Buses traveling around the country]



On Oct. 3, 2020, Korea’s National Foundation Day holiday, police buses and policemen blockaded Gwanghwamun Square. Ordinary citizens had a hard time getting to the square. There

were more than 90 security checkpoints where personal vehicles and citizens were questioned. Tour buses were not able to enter into Seoul. Subway stations near Gwanghwamun, including Gwanghwamun Station, City Hall Station and Gyeongbokgung Station were closed, and trains didn't stop there.

[Police buses loop around Gwanghwamun Square to stop people from entering on Oct. 3, 2020.]




The Moon Jae-in administration, which knows that the anger among citizens is growing and the truth about election fraud is spreading, blocked people from gathering in the square by using police officers and police buses, citing the danger of infection and transmission of Covid-19, which came from China. On the same day, Korea's amusement parks like Seoul Grand Park and Everland were packed with people lined up to enjoy the holiday. The scene spread through the press and people realized that the government was suppressing freedom of assembly over fake reasons, such as the danger of Covid-19.

B. A junkyard in Siheung, Gyeonggi, and ballot papers found in a dump

Election related documents and mail-in ballot papers were found at a junkyard in Siheung, Gyeonggi, on July 4, 2020. The papers were originally heading from Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang, to Chungyang, South Chungcheong. The junkyard could have been the one responsible for disposing the election-related documents assigned by the National Election Committee (NEC). However, mail-in ballot papers could be found at neither the junkyard nor the NEC. It would make sense if the papers were found at the polling station they were used at or at the local election commission, but they can't be found at the NEC.

[Ballot paper and a hard drive with some 18,000 fake passports stored in it were found in Siheung in July and August.]



The NEC explained that the paper found was supposed to go from a Gyeongju early voting polling station to Chungyang-gun and said that “there were mistakes made in managing them, and we apologize to the people.” “We will be more careful in managing the early voting and securely storing related documents from now on and we will do our best to prevent this from happening again by taking a look at the overall election administrative procedures,” it added. This is significant evidence of election fraud and it can’t be resolved through an apology.

According to a thorough investigation of mail-in voting, two ballot papers that headed from Gyeongju to Chungyang were discovered. One was sent on April 10, and the other was sent on April 11. The tracking number for the April 10 paper was 1068808838824. According to the tracking history, it traveled as follows: Gyeongju post office – Pohang distribution center – Daejeon exchange center – Daejeon distribution center – Gyeongju post office – Pohang distribution center – Daejeon distribution center – Chungyang post office. The route doesn’t make sense. Normally, the route should be as following: Gyeongju post office – Gyeongju post office – Pohang distribution center – Pohang distribution center – Daejeon exchange center – Daejeon exchange center – Daejeon distribution center – Daejeon distribution center – Chungyang post office. The distance between Gyeongju and Pohang is 27.9 kilometers and it normally takes less than 30 minutes. However, the tracking record shows that it took less than 10 minutes, which means that it is fake. This means that it was a fake mail-in ballot paper, and that it was a paper manipulated by the server.

[The tracking history of the April 10 mail-in ballot paper traveling from Gyeongju to Chungyang.]

국내우편(등기/택배)배송조회

HOME > 원광직 배송조회 > 국내우편(등기/택배) 배송조회

등기 및 택배 우편물의 배송정보를 조회할 수 있습니다.

기본정보

등기번호	보내는곳/발송날짜	받는곳/수신날짜	취급구분	배달결과
T068808838824	신+우편물 2020.04.10	청+군선거관리위원회 2020.04.11		배달완료

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황
2020.04.10	20:03	경주우체국	접수
2020.04.11	01:44	포항우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	03:19	대전교함센터	도착
2020.04.11	04:33	대전교함센터	발송
2020.04.11	04:48	대전우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	09:21	경주우체국	발송
2020.04.11	09:31	포항우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	10:33	대전우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	11:47	청양우체국	도착
2020.04.11	12:43	청양우체국	배달준비 김백환 이주복
2020.04.11	13:46	청양우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:윤+옥남 - 회사용)

In August, a discarded hard drive was found at a dumping ground near Siheung, where the mail-in ballot paper was discarded. Some 18,000 fake passports were stored in the drive. This might have been a coincidence. However, given the evidence that sophisticated illegal election busing or handling of ballots took place, along with other evidence the suspicion of improper foreign involvement in the electoral process. More votes were cast than the actual number of voters. Mail-in ballot papers took abnormal routes. Significant errors were found in the travel time for mail-in ballots. As noted, this raises the possibility that foreigners, who don't understand or know Korean culture and norms, were involved in manipulating the server and the mail-in voting process. There were early voting ballot papers that were stiff and never folded. It is possible that Chinese, for example, may have been involved in the operation, since they are accustomed to voting without folding their ballot papers.


[Chinese vote without folding ballot papers.]



2. Clear irregularities between the votes cast on the official voting day and those from the early voting process, particularly for mail-in voting

A. Abnormal histograms and graphs

When the results for the votes cast on the official voting day and those from the early voting process are drawn in histograms and graphs, one can find graphs that can't exist in the real world. They can be found clearly by comparing them to graphs from the 2016 election. There were clear irregularities between the official voting day's outcomes and the early voting process results. Clear irregularities can be found even after breaking it down into districts. This kind of normal distribution can't exist when considering the fact that a very large number of votes, or a large number of samples, were involved. In particular, in the Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi regions, the count for the DP was 63 percent and the figure for the LKP was 36 percent. It is a true mystery as to why all three metropolitan regions' results were the same. "It can't happen unless God has planned it to be so in advance," said Park Sung-hyun, the former president of the Korea Academy of Science and Technology. Professor Park Young-ah, who graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in physics and earned doctorate in physics from the University of Pennsylvania, also said it is a statistical impossibility. "It is like tossing 1,000 coins at once and all of them landing heads up."



SNS에서 제기된 수도권 사전투표 득표율 비교

	서울		인천		경기	
	득표수	비율	득표수	비율	득표수	비율
민주당	1,238,494	63.64%	348,867	63.22%	1,547,957	63.14%
통합당	707,633	36.36%	202,957	36.78%	903,579	36.86%

B. Significant changes in the outcome between early voting and the actual voting day results

The ruling Democratic Party took 180 seats and the main opposition Liberty Korea Party took 103 as a result of the April 15 election fraud. However, when only considering the “Inside Jurisdiction” votes, or just “Inside Jurisdiction” votes and mail-in votes (early voting for “Outside Jurisdiction”), the gap increases significantly. In the former case, the DP would have 198 seats, while the LKP would only get 49 seats. In the latter case, a total of 204 seats would

go to the DP and 44 would go to the LKP. When only considering the results from mail-in voting, the DP would have 210 seats and the LKP would get 37 seats. One can find a significant gap between the parties depending on the scenario, which might have resulted in the LKP winning fewer than 50 seats. The LKP would win more seats than the DP if the results from the actual voting day were the only ones counted.


[Scenarios: Actual Result vs. Early Voting vs. Mail-in Voting vs. Official Day Voting]

Party	Actual Result	Inside Jurisdiction Early Voting	Mail-in Voting	Official Day Voting
Democratic Party	180	198	210	123
Liberty Korea Party	103	49	37	124
Justice Party	6	2	-	1
People's Party	3	-	-	-
Independent	5	3	-	5
People's Democratic Party	-	1	-	-

C. Election map showing the results for mail-in voting and the official day voting

Looking at the election map showing the results for the mail-in voting and the official day voting adds to suspicions of potential election fraud. These are the same people living within the same district, and it is physically impossible for their voting patterns, or results, to be significantly different just because they voted early or on the official day.

[Differences in election results based on the voting date]




Incheon



Ulsan



North Chungcheong




As you can see in above maps, there were clear differences depending on when people voted. There are clear differences in the results even though they are all living in the same districts.

D. More seniors, who tend to be conservative, participated in early voting

[NEC's data for early voting by age group]

	Total	18~19	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	70 and over
Number of voters	43,961,157	1,153,662	6,796,623	6,994,134	8,357,423	8,649,821	6,439,959	5,569,535
Early voters	11,742,677	263,505	1,720,002	1,494,267	2,074,663	2,576,527	2,152,575	1,461,138
Turnout (%)	26.71	22.84	25.31	21.36	24.82	29.79	33.43	26.23



According to the NEC's data provided to the National Assembly and elsewhere, the turnout for early voting was highest among those who are in 60s, at 33.43 percent. It was followed by those in their 50s (29.79 percent) and in their 70s and over (26.23 percent). It was lowest for those in their 30s at only 21.36 percent. This means that seniors, who tend to be more conservative, participated more in early voting. It is more logical to believe that votes for the LKP were significantly higher for early voting when looking at turnout data by age group. However, the DP won by a huge margin in early voting, which is totally different from previous voting trends.

3. Moving from suspicion to conviction during the evidence-preservation process and election invalidation lawsuits

A. Ghost votes: Collecting sensitive personal information to create ghost votes

The preservation of evidence process brought out some key findings. A voter who didn't vote during the early voting process was recorded in election notes as voting during early voting. The voter found out about this by visiting a polling station on the official election day. There were multiple cases reported in which people were counted as voting in the early voting process even though they had not. There was an informant who said that people incarcerated in prisons or detention facilities were forced to sign that they voted even though they had not. There are some 40 districts that have more voters than their actual population. This is believed to be because the manipulation tactics only focused on raising the number of votes without considering the actual number of registered voters in those districts. That resulted in the number of voters being larger than the population.

유권자수(선거인수)>인구수 (21대 총선)

지역	선거인수	투표자수	2020.3연구수	2020.4연구수	
서울동작구	노량진2동	12,783	8,575	12,711	12,674
파주시	진동면	201	181	159	159
파주시	군내면	617	513	580	578
연천군	중면	206	161	195	198
광덕시	홍북동	4,353	2,811	4,139	4,163
안성시	고삼면	2,157	1,655	1,930	1,937
하남시	신장1동	6,593	4,190	6,440	6,474
대전중구	유천1동	6,906	4,228	6,754	6,758
세종시	연기면	2,776	1,782	2,605	2,596
충주시	성내.충인동	3,047	2,055	2,803	2,814
보령시	대전2동	7,103	5,200	7,065	7,026
부산중구영도구	광복동	1,175	820	1,117	1,117
부산남구	용호제3동	13,777	10,461	12,768	12,728
대구달성군	하빈면	3,843	2,670	3,752	3,726
경주시	보덕동	2,029	1,582	1,824	1,820
경산시	중앙동	6,976	4,498	6,706	6,708
상주시	회북면	1,474	1,070	1,256	1,250
영주시	영주2동	3,800	2,854	3,653	3,640
구미시	원평1동	3,941	2,098	3,898	3,898
구미시	원평2동	3,879	2,681	3,401	3,387
마산합포구	가포동	923	722	672	672
거창군	남하면	1,758	1,413	1,428	1,426
거창군	마리면	2,048	1,554	1,996	1,988
거창군	주상면	1,580	1,245	1,559	1,560
함안군	산인면	3,015	2,251	2,769	2,756
밀양시	내말동	3,322	2,307	2,900	2,884
사천시	축동면	1,753	1,283	1,681	1,667
통영시	명정동	3,380	2,418	3,128	3,100
철원군	근북면	233	209	111	112
강릉시	중앙동	5,529	3,835	5,116	5,107
강릉시	옥천동	3,700	2,515	3,392	3,387
준천시	신동면	2,891	2,164	2,584	2,588
원주시	중앙동	3,085	1,846	2,846	2,851
서귀포시	정방동	2,447	1,458	2,243	2,238
여주시	화정면	1,815	1,241	1,334	1,330
군산시	중앙동	3,355	2,410	2,907	2,900

유보 : 3월연구>선거인수 and 4월연구<선거인수

There is a high likelihood that people listed as early voters on the integrated voter list server did not actually vote when considering these examples. There also is a high chance that they manipulated votes or created ghost votes using the private information of people who are incarcerated in detention centers or prisons, hospitalized in nursing homes or the elderly, who have a lower chance of voting. The NEC, in fact, collected sensitive personal information such as criminal records, education level, wealth, medical history, tax information, education level and registered addresses from some 5 million people. It appears that they used the 5 million people’s personal data to create ghost votes through the voting management server. (There are typically no more than 10 candidates per district, and this means that the total number of candidates from 253 districts would certainly be less than 5,000, and not even reach 2,530. There is no reason for the NEC to store the sensitive information of 5 million people in the database). There is a large chance that up to 5 million votes were cast by ghosts.

[Document related to personal information collected by the NEC]

개인정보 열람범위 대상		
시스템명	개인정보파일 처리내역	실시사유
선거관리시스템	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 수집대상 정보 : 성명, 주민등록번호, 주소, 전화번호, 이메일, 등록기준지, 전파, 별명, 학력, 납세, 교육경력, 재산 보유예정 개인정보 수 : 약 500만명 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 개인정보 : 100만 이상 처리 고유식별정보 : 5만 이상 처리
통합영부시스템	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 수집대상 정보 : 성명, 생년월일, 성별, 주민등록번호, 가족자녀, 근로장 20년 이력, 주소 보유예정 개인정보 수 : 약 4,200만명(한국기준) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 개인정보 : 100만 이상 처리 고유식별정보 : 5만 이상 처리
제외선거관리시스템 (영부영부시스템 포함)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 수집대상 정보 : 성명, 주민등록번호, 여권번호, 전화번호, 이메일, 등록기준지, 최종주소지, 국외거주 주소, 선거권결격정보 보유 개인정보 수 : 약 50만명 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 고유식별정보 : 5만 이상 처리
제외선거 인터넷 신고·신청시스템 (제외선거 영부영부시스템 포함)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 수집대상 정보 : 성명, 주민등록번호, 여권번호, 전화번호, 이메일, 등록기준지, 최종주소지, 국외거주 주소, 선거권결격정보 보유 개인정보 수 : 약 10만명 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 고유식별정보 : 5만 이상 처리

It is plausible that the NEC is not releasing the integrated voter list due to this ghost voter issue, even though there are lawsuits against them – requesting the voter list be released. It has been more than five months now since the recount lawsuits were filed in the court. The ghost vote issue is believed to be why the recount is not happening.

B. Stiff ballot papers like new bills and those with different sizes

People were able to take some photos of the ballot papers stored in the ballot box for early voting during the preservation of evidence process in Guri, Gyeonggi. Shocking results were discovered.

[Early voting ballot papers for Guri]



All of the ballot papers at the Guri election commission had ballot 1 (the ruling party) selected, and none of them were ever folded. They were stiff just like new dollar bills. Typically, ballot papers are sorted after the election as either valid or invalid. There is a separate piece of paper that shows, or summarizes, information such as the type of election and the name of the district for each valid and invalid vote. However, stacks of ballot papers, which were never folded, can be seen stored in the box without the separate piece of paper summarizing the total number of valid votes.

[Early voting ballot paper for Cheongju's Sangdang district]



[Early voting ballot paper for Namyangju-si's 2nd district]



According to the vote counting manual for the 21st general election published by the NEC, the officials need to check the name of the district, the type of election and sort the votes as either valid or invalid based on each party and candidate after the election through the separate sheet of paper in the box that summarizes the results of the valid votes. Both valid and invalid votes go into sorting boxes and are sealed with stickers with the commissioner's stamp on them. Information such as the name of the district and the type of the election must also be written on the boxes. Most of the boxes with stacks of stiff ballot papers didn't have the separate paper summarizing the valid vote results.

[NEC's published ballot count management manual for the 21st general election]

7 투표지 등 정리·보관 [정리부]

투표지 정리



- 개표가 완료된 투표지는 유·무효투표집계전 등을 통해 해당 선거(구)명, 투표종류, 투표구명을 확인한 후 정당·후보자별로 유효표를 구분하여 무효표와 함께 투표지 정리상자에 넣고,
- 투표지 정리상자에는 선거(구)명, 투표종류, 투표구명을 기재한 후 봉합테이프로 봉합하고 위원장 도장으로 봉인함

[위원장 도장을 찍을 직원을 사전에 지정].
 ※ 개표상황표 시본을 투표지와 함께 포장가능

Stiff ballot papers that were never folded like new dollar bills were found in many districts, including Namyangju and Cheongju, during the evidence-preservation process. According to Article 157, Section 4, and Article 158, Section 4 of the Public Official Election Act, “An elector, after receiving the ballot paper, shall enter a balloting booth, select one candidate (referring to one political party in the election of the proportional representative National Assembly members and the election of the proportional representative local council members), from among those entered in the ballot paper, make a mark in the corresponding column of the ballot paper, fold the ballot paper on the spot so that other persons cannot see the contents, and then put it in the ballot box in the presence of the voting witnesses,” and “Upon receipt of a ballot paper and an envelope for return, an elector shall enter a balloting booth, choose one candidate (referring to one political party in cases of an election of proportional representative National Assembly members or an election of proportional representative local council members), put a mark in the corresponding column of the balloting paper, fold it on the spot so that no one can see the balloting, put it into the envelope for return, seal it, and then put the envelope into the advance polling box.” This clearly shows that there cannot be any ballot papers that are not folded.

Public Official Election Act

Article 157 (Procedure for Receiving and Recording Ballot Papers),(4)An elector, after receiving the ballot paper, shall enter a balloting booth, select one candidate (referring to one political party in the election of the proportional representative National Assembly members and the election of the proportional representative local council members), from among those entered in the ballot paper, make a mark in the corresponding column of the ballot paper, fold the ballot paper on the spot so that other persons cannot see the contents, and then put it in the ballot box in the presence of the voting witnesses. <Amended by Act No. 6663, Mar. 7, 2002; Act No. 7189, Mar. 12, 2004; Act No. 7681, Aug. 4, 2005>

Article 158(Advance Polling),(4) Upon receipt of a ballot paper and an envelope for return, an elector shall enter a balloting booth, choose one candidate (referring to one political party in cases of an election of proportional representative National Assembly members or an election of proportional representative local council members), put a mark in the corresponding column of the balloting paper, fold it on the spot so that no one can see the balloting, put it into the envelope for return, seal it, and then put the envelope into the advance polling box.

It is even more impossible for ballot papers for proportional representatives to be stiff. In this election, there were a total of 35 parties who ran for proportional representative seats, and the ballot papers for them had to be longer than the envelope they were placed in. Voters had to fold their ballot papers for that reason. This means that the voters had no other option but to physically fold their ballot papers to fit them in the envelopes, not to mention the requirement set by law to do so. However, there were ballot papers for proportional representatives found at the polling station that were not folded.

[Ballot paper for early voting found at the polling station in Namyangju]



It could be possible for one or two unfolded ballot papers to be found at the polling station. However, it is not possible for a stack of unfolded ballot papers to exist. While the alleged perpetrators simply may not have been meticulous enough, it is also possible that people unfamiliar with Korean law, custom and culture were involved in this apparent electoral misconduct. Regardless, the discovery of pristine in such numbers and at many different locations is cause for serious concern.



C. Ballot papers stored in a commercial bread company's bread boxes, ripped off seal stickers and damaged ballot boxes

In its manual for election related supplies for the 2020 election, the NEC gave out specific guidelines that show which type of boxes can be used to store the ballot papers. Boxes that don't meet the requirements cannot be legally used in the election. However, during the evidence-preservation process, it was found out that ballot papers were stored in bread boxes made by a

commercial bread company. Ballot papers for early voting and mail-in voting, in particular, were found in those boxes.

선거용품 매뉴얼 2020

3. 투표지 정리·보관상자

아름다운 선거
행사의 시작입니다

재질 | B골 골판지 규격 | 1호 1,000매용 (가로)345mm X (세로)235mm X (높이)90mm
 2호 2,000매용 (가로)345mm X (세로)235mm X (높이)130mm
 3호 3,000매용 (가로)345mm X (세로)235mm X (높이)180mm
 4호 4,000매용 (가로)345mm X (세로)235mm X (높이)240mm



1. 투표지 정리·보관상자
 2. 투표지 투입구
 3. 투표지 투입구
 4. 투표지 투입구
 5. 투표지 투입구



“After the early voting day, there were cases where we needed more boxes than we had prepared to store ballot papers in advance,” the NEC explained. “It was early in the morning and we were short of the [official] boxes, and that was why we used the boxes [from the bread company] at the polling station, which were there to supply snacks for the vote counting process.” However, the NEC’s explanation is false, as they needed the boxes five days after the election. Also, they knew exactly how many people voted in the early voting process, which makes it hard to believe their explanation that they ran out boxes. Furthermore, it was later found out that the boxes that supposedly contained bread for people participating in the vote counting process were never used

for that specific purpose. There also is no reason to believe that the specific brand's boxes had to be used to store the early-voting ballot papers. It is explained clearly in the NEC's 2020 manual that there is a specific procedure, or system, for checking boxes with "Inside Jurisdiction" early voting ballot papers, "Outside Jurisdiction [mail-in votes]" early voting ballot papers and their dates. The NEC's explanation about the bread box issue is clearly false.

The bread box issue raised the possibility that the company that produces the bread was involved in the election manipulation process. Bread companies tend to have well-structured delivery systems, which allows them to deliver easily to any election commissions around the country, even late at night where not many people are outside. We believe that there is a significant connection between the bread manufacturing company, the factory that produced stiff ballot papers for the early voting and whoever was involved in delivering the boxes.



We found a damaged seal sticker and pin, which was used to lock the ballot box, during the evidence-preservation process. Also, there were cases where the seal paper had the stamp on the wrong place. There also were some signs that these seal papers were detached and attached. Furthermore, we found out that it was even possible to insert ballot papers into the ballot box and take them out again through the hole. We found that areas around the hole were damaged. The evidence-preservation process started at the second district of Incheon's Yeonsu district. We called attention to the fact that 9 of the ballot boxes' seal papers were damaged. However, the NEC provided all ballot boxes without seal papers during the evidence-preservation process.

D. Findings on destroyed envelopes for mail-in voting and ballot papers



There were a number of destroyed ballot papers and envelopes near Yeosu and Guri in Gyeonggi. There were multiple fires at the distribution centers that store election-related items, junkyards and garbage dumps after the April 15 election. It is estimated that there have been more than 77 fires since the election. Findings on the destroyed ballot papers and envelopes mean that there is a high possibility that mail-in ballot envelopes and ballot papers were fabricated and replaced with others.


During the beginning of the election-preservation process, many focused on the manipulation through the server using the ballot printing machines or electronic vote counting machines, instead of the offline, or on-site, manipulation. However, more and more circumstantial evidence came out showing the possibility of replacing ballot papers or inserting ballot papers offline as we proceeded with the evidence-preservation process. Around the time of the fourth election-preservation process, we were sure that manipulation happened offline. In other words, some votes were replaced or inserted. We found out that this was done by certain operatives through the aforementioned bread company.

E. Non-standard ballot papers

QR codes were used in all the early voting process, including both “Inside Jurisdiction” voting and mail-in voting. Article 151, Section 6, of the Public Official Election Act says, “the Gu/Si/Gun election commission shall instruct the official in charge of advance polling management to produce ballot papers to be distributed at advance polling stations with a ballot paper printer at advance polling stations. In such cases, the serial numbers printed on the ballot papers shall be marked in the form of bar code (referring to a code marked in the shape of a bar for recognition by computer), and such bar code may contain the name of election, the name of constituency, and the name of the competent election commission.” The law clearly mentions that a “bar code” should be used, not a QR code. Even though the law prohibits them from using QR codes, they were used in the April 15 21st general election. The NEC is not providing the source code for the QR code. There are suspicions that the QR code played a significant role in

manipulating the vote counting process by interlocking with electronic vote counting machines and outside servers.

[Non-standard ballot papers found in Chuncheon]



Multiple ballot papers were found that had too vertical margins that were too large or margins that were too short horizontally in polling stations in Chuncheon, Daejeon, Daegu and Seongbuk in Seoul. There also were cases where the papers themselves were invalid and those where they were attached to each other. The margins of ballot paper are strictly regulated by the rule limiting margins to 0.5 centimeters. Printers are designed to avoid making any mistakes in this regard. However, invalid ballot papers were found in many locations. We believe this was because manipulated ballot papers were printed and inserted later on in order to match the election results set by the electronic data manipulation.

4. Thorough investigation of mail-in voting through the postal office tracking system

A. NEC's ridiculous explanation of mail-in votes found during the evidence-preservation process

The NEC gave a ridiculous statement referring to stiff ballot papers for early voting as “shape memory-like paper.” It lied again when it said it “used boxes that were there to serve snacks due to the shortage of official boxes” when explaining the Samlip bread boxes. There can't be such paper or any non-official boxes, since there are official boxes. The NEC officials continued to give out explanations that were full of lies when asked questions about various things such as seal stickers, stamp, tape and ballot boxes during the evidence-preservation process.

[Registered mail envelopes that were secured during evidence preservation]



We were able to find registered mail envelopes used during early voting during the evidence-preservation process. There were tracking numbers for each envelope, as well as barcodes and numbers containing information such as the polling station and voters' registered voting district. Anyone can check the tracking history of the registered mail by going to the website (<https://service.epost.go.kr/iservice/>). We first entered the tracking number that we acquired. Then we tried different numbers that come before and after the number we have. We found out that there were votes that traveled on routes that make no sense or recorded travel times that aren't possible in the real world. When asked about the issue, the NEC said this was a "simple error," "mistake" and "mismanagement."

The NEC tends to give out these kinds of explanations when they have no other words to say. We suddenly became very curious about the issue. Can it really be just a simple error or mistake, considering that there are so many similar cases? The recount was continuously postponed and the NEC came up with a ridiculous explanation. This is why I have decided to investigate every piece of registered mail used in the early voting. We tracked the history of 2,725,843 pieces of mail and saved all related shipping information such as sender and recipient, delivery date, delivery status, mail origin, date and time, deliveryman and actual recipient. After checking the post office's tracking system, we categorized the irregular activity into 31 categories. A total of 1,110,672 cases were confirmed as irregular votes, and this accounts for 40.4 percent of the total mail-in votes, or 2.72 million. The NEC can no longer dismiss this issue as a "simple error," "mistake" and "mismanagement" after our investigation.

B. Conclusion of the investigation: Suspicious mail-in vote records, and an appeal for help

There is a significant reason why mail-in votes are vulnerable to election fraud. Mail-in votes do not have any CCTVs monitoring them. The votes were not sealed while they were distributed or while they were waiting to be transferred. There were no objective surveillance mechanisms like CCTVs used during the distribution process. Police officers are required to follow their route according to the rules, but they were not there. Sometimes, the votes were delivered by deliverymen working for private shipping companies. In the official notes for the vote counting process, the main server entered the number of votes cast without any records of the number of votes processed per hour. It was also found that the polling workers didn't count them separately

or report the issue to higher-ups. The NEC ordered all polling stations to cover their CCTVs using newspapers. They were setting up preconditions for illegal manipulation.

중앙선거관리위원회 2020년 국회의원 선거관련 IT 분야 사업내역

사 업 명	투찰율	낙찰금액	선정기업	비 고
1. 전산장비 기술지원 및 유지관리 사업	99.925%	200,750,000		
2. 투표지 분류기 기술지원 사업	100%	78,700,000		
3. 투표용지 발급기 기술지원 사업	100%	178,000,000		
4. 정보보호 시스템 기술지원 및 유지관리 사업	99.619%	70,730,000		
5. 21대 선거 정보시스템 운영지원 및 성능관리	99.972%	427,881,730		
6. 2020년 선거정보시스템 통합 위탁운영 사업	100%	2,009,000,000		
7. 사전투표 명부 단일기 등 임차 사업	99.981%	3,310,000,000		
8. 유,무선 통신장비 구매 및 구축 사업	99.991%	372,400,000		
9. 유,무선 통신장비 유지보수 및 보급 사업	99.974%	513,000,000		
10. 국회의원선거용 투표지 심사계수기 임차 사업	99.987%	649,920,000		360mm
11. 국회의원선거용 투표지 심사계수기 임차 사업	99.100%	911,887,200		519mm
12. 제21대 국회의원선거 대비 통신·보안장비 개선 사업	100%	359,000,000		



The NEC even committed corruption in the bidding to prepare for the April 15 election fraud. The NEC recorded 100 percent of the base price, with the lowest number being 99.619 percent, for the bidding process of its 12 projects. Some of the projects are as following: technical support for electronic devices and management (bidding price of 200,750,000 won), ballot printer and technical support (bidding price of 178,000,000 won) and wired and wireless communication devices purchase and installation (bidding price of 372,400,000 won). This is an unbelievable bidding rate. The rate mentioned above refers to the percentage of the final price out of the original base price. The 100 percent figure means that the bid price was exactly the same as the one that the ordering agency put out at first. Normally, it is hard to see a rate over 90 percent since there will be many companies joining in the bidding competition. This suggests that they allowed specific companies to bid for projects illegitimately to achieve the goal of manipulating the electronic data.

■ mail voting

registered voters	votes	valid votes	invalid votes	abstention
2,724,714	2,722,790	2,671,307	51,483	1,924

■ investigation of tracking numbers

number of tracking numbers	number of investigation	missing numbers
2,725,843	2,724,653	1,190

■ results of investigation

	total (investgated)	normal	abnormal	abnormal (accumulated)
votes	2,724,653	1,623,981	1,100,672	2,194,749
percentage	100	59.60	40.40	

[Graph of Mail Census Result]

■ invalid types²⁾

types	number	explanation
fail to deliver	5	fail to deliver(reason: moving)
deliver after election day	4	deliver after election day
deliver without sending process	5,354	deliver without sending process
post office - acception error case	17,683	when mail in ballots accepted at A post office, mail in ballots are should be departed from A post office in the next step. But mail in ballots are

types	number	explanation
		departed from B post office.
post office - departure error case	150,590	when mail in ballots arrived at C post office, mail in ballots are should be departed from C post office in the next step. But mail in ballots are departed from D post office.
post office - inconsistent status error	391,735	when mail in ballots departed from E post office, mail in ballots are should be departed from E post office in the next step. But mail in ballots are departed from F post office.
same post office error	29,688	mail in ballots accepted and delivered at same post office.
out for delivery - proceed other post office	2,105	when mail in ballots status are 'out for delivery from G post office', its next step should be 'delivered by G post office'. But H post office delivered mail in ballots.
out for delivery and never delivered	212,020	when mail in ballots status are 'out for delivery', its next step should be 'delivered'. But arrived or departed process still continued.
no results	2	no delivery results
delivery results error - arrived	138,853	In Korea post office system, delivery results should be 'delivered' when recipients get mails. but 'arrived' showed in next step.
delivery results error - no received dates	138,860	In Korea post office system, date received should be on basic information. but no received dates cases are founded.
recipient error	5,903	Recipients should be electoral officers or delegate- coworker. But there are many suspicious delegates like spouse, housemate, sibling, etc.
delivery results error - continued error	140,515	In Korea post office system, delivery results should be 'delivered' when recipients get mails. but 'arrived' or 'departed' showed in next step.
cancel acceptance error	29,812	acceptation after cancel of acceptation, and repeats acceptation and cancel of acceptation.
deliver name error - no name	4,511	missing deliver name
deliver name error - non existence	68,539	deliver names are not human name, like special duty or communication team or special team or on duty or

types	number	explanation
		something else
inconsistent status error	71,518	not 'arrived-departed' consistent status (ex: arrived-arrived, or departure-departure)
deliver time error - too long	1,421	took 60 hours from acceptance to delivered.
deliver time error - too short	145,370	took less than 10 minutes from arrived to departed at same post office.
deliver time error - too long	413	took more than 30 hours from arrived to departed at same post office.
deliver time error - too short	43,070	took less than 10 minutes from arrived to departed at same mail center ³ .
deliver time error - too long	78,488	took more than 30 hours from arrived to departed at same mail center.
transit time error - too short	307,826	took too short time between mail centers
transit time error - too long	3,256	took too long time between mail centers (more than 2 hours)
transit time error - too short	60,094	took too short time between post office
transit time error - too long	2,202	took too long time between post office (more than 2 hours)
transit time error - too short	11,295	took too short time between post office and district electoral committee(post office and district electoral committee are in same region)
transit time error - too long	133,617	took too long time between post office and district electoral committee(more than 5 hours. post office and district electoral committee are in same region)
total	2,194,749	

The largest number of irregular activities were those with errors in delivery time, delivery route and the delivery process. There were a total of 391,735 instances of mail not being delivered after it was dispatched from the postal office. There were another 212,020 cases where mail was processed without "Delivery Completed." There were 307,826 cases where the travel time from the distribution centers to other distribution centers was shorter than what it really takes according to GPS. Another 150,590 cases included mail processed from different postal offices other than the actual postal office responsible for the destination. There were five cases where the mail was never delivered and another four cases where the mail was delivered after the early voting days. For mail sent to the officials working for government organizations like the NEC, only the recipient can receive the mail. But there were 5,903 cases where the recipient's siblings or partners received it instead. There were 4,511 cases where the name of the deliveryman was missing. There were another 68,539 cases where the name of deliveryman was not an actual name and was recorded as "Special Unit," "Communication Unit," "Special Team," "Chief

Basic infor

기분정보 sender name/sent date Recipient/date received


마스킹 (*)해제조회 ① 제한표시에대한 근거

Tracking number	동기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분	배달결과	result
1068809898761	선*우편물	2020.04.10	강*구선거관리위원회		배달완료	

배송 진행상황 Status of item

date	날짜	time	시간	Post office (location)	발생국	status	처리현황
2020.04.10		21:20		하남우체국		검수	accepted
2020.04.10		21:40		하남우체국		발송	departed
2020.04.10		22:40		동서울우편집중국		도착	arrived
2020.04.11		05:02		동서울우편집중국		발송	departed
2020.04.11		05:50		서울강동우체국		도착	arrived
2020.04.11		14:20		서울강동우체국		배달준비	out for delivery
						김배원:윤희근	
2020.04.11		16:22		서울강동우체국		배달완료 (배달)	delivered
						(수령인:지*경남 - 대리수령인: -동거인)	(recipient: - delegate - housemate)

When broken down into regions, there was more irregular activity in Seoul, Gyeonggi, Incheon and Sejong. Seoul, Gyeonggi and Incheon are Korea's key swing states, like Ohio, Iowa and Wisconsin are in the United States. This is why there was more irregular activity in these regions. The rate for irregular votes was near the 50 percent level. The number of irregular votes in Gyeonggi was 328,895, followed by Seoul (285,602) and Incheon (66,453). Ironically, there were only four legitimate votes in Sejong, while 24,250 of them were irregular.





Interestingly, there were many irregular votes in Daegu (41,945) and North Gyeongsang (55,028). One can guess that they were manipulated across the country, including in these regions, to make turnout exceed 15 percent, which is needed for election campaign spending reimbursement. There is only one district where the ruling Democratic Party received less than 15 percent of the vote in the April 15 election. It appears that those who were involved in the manipulation not only worked on getting the 180 seats but also on meeting the requirement to receive reimbursement for each candidate.

When considering the errors found in the mail-in voting and their gravity, including delivery route, delivery time and name of recipient and deliveryman, this cannot be resolved through an explanation that this was a simple error or mistake. We believe this was possible because the manipulation using the server was done by foreigners, who do not understand Korean norms. Additionally, there were some unusual last names used that are not Korean, and the name of the specific team or unit was used for the name of the deliveryman. This is clear evidence that foreigners were involved in manipulating the postal office server.

It becomes obvious which country was involved in the electronic manipulation when taking a look at a few of the facts available. Chinese Huawei network devices were used in the April 15 election. On July 10, 2019, Yang Jung-chul, then head of the ruling Democratic Party's Institute for Democracy think tank, visited the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China to sign a policy agreement to engage in social exchange to build networks in the global politics area. On the next day, he visited the leading Chinese leading IT company Tencent in Shenzhen. The Moon Jae-in administration didn't ban Chinese from entering the country even after the

outbreak of the Chinese Wuhan Corona crisis. We can't erase the suspicions that Chinese Tencent hackers were involved in the April 15 general election.

C. Evidence of fraudulent mail-in voting by type

1) Problems with the recipient and deliveryman

There were 19,437 cases where the names of the recipients for the NEC were something like “Sae, X, Reul,” “Gae, X,” “Hee, X,” “Geul, X,” “Ggae, X.” None of them were listed in the employers’ list and cannot be the name of Korean citizens. In 68,539 cases, the name for the deliveryman was abnormal as well. They didn't use actual names but terms like “Communication Unit,” “Special Unit” and “Special Team.” The NEC is a governmental organization. There were 5,097 cases where the spouse of the recipient received the mail. Another 800 cases were those received by siblings or partners living together. There were 4,511 cases missing the deliveryman's name. The reason why there were so many names like these used is because there is a high possibility of Chinese involvement, who don't know Korean names or systems. This is a significant error would not happen if one understood the meaning of each category correctly.

[Example of a recipient's non-Korean last name]

기본정보		마스킹(+)해제조회	제한표시에대한 근거
등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분
1068808799071	신*우편물 2020.04.10	고*시덕양구선거관리위원회 2020.04.11	배달결과 배달완료

배송 진행상황			
날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황
2020.04.10	21:08	서울서초우체국	접수
2020.04.10	22:20	서울서초우체국	발송
2020.04.10	22:53	동서울우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	04:19	동서울우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	05:16	고양우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	09:39	고양우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	10:37	고양일산우체국	도착
2020.04.11	10:53	고양일산우체국	배달준비 김배원:이희정
2020.04.11	16:32	고양일산우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:캐*을님 회사동료)

개수		기본정보		마스킹(+해제조회)	제한표시에대한근거	
개*님-회사동료	500	등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분	배달결과
거*시선거관리위원회님-본인	92	1068802790766	안*우편물 2020.04.10	사*동시선거관리위원회 2020.04.13		배달완료
광*시선거관리위원회님-본인	68	배송 진행상황				
글*은님-회사동료	3,852	날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황	
익*화님-본인	299	2020.04.10	21:03	부산우체국	접수	
깨*을님-회사동료	2,597	2020.04.10	21:06	부산우체국	발송	
김*정님-회사동료	36	2020.04.10	21:33			
밤*호님-회사동료	2,000	2020.04.12	00:40			
새*름님-회사동료	861	2020.04.12	03:34			
울*님-본인	300	2020.04.12	04:37			
위*복님-회사동료	13	2020.04.12	14:17			
조*민님-회사동료	1	2020.04.13	06:34			
총*진님-회사동료	3,201	2020.04.13	08:34			
침*영님-회사동료	500	2020.04.13	08:34			
항*희님-회사동료	100	2020.04.13	09:20			
형*희님-회사동료	50	2020.04.13	11:02	서울우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:글*은님 - 회사동료)	
황*경님-회사동료	1,500					
황*군선거관리위원회님-본인	8					
히*로님-회사동료	486					
히*주님-회사동료	2,973					
총합계	19,437					

배달완료 (배달)
(수령인:히*주님 - 회사동료)

배달완료 (배달)
(수령인:글*은님 - 회사동료)

배달완료 (배달)
(수령인:글*은님 - 회사동료)

[Example of a recipient's partner or sibling receiving the mail]

기본정보		마스킹(+해제조회)	제한표시에대한근거	
등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분	배달결과
1068809803015	선*우편물 2020.04.10	유*구선거관리위원회 2020.04.11		배달완료
배송 진행상황		recipient error: 5,903 cases		
날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황	
2020.04.10	20:08	안동우체국	접수	
2020.04.10	20:42	안동우체국	발송	
2020.04.10	20:53	안동우편집중국	도착	
2020.04.10	23:32	안동우편집중국	발송	
2020.04.11	02:14	대전교환센터	도착	
2020.04.11	04:33	대전교환센터	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:허*원님 - 형제자매)	
Recipients should be electoral officers or delegate—coworker.		대전우편집중국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:지*경님 - 대리수령인 -동거인!)	
But there are many suspicious delegates like spouse, housemate, sibling, etc.		대전유성우체국	도착	
2020.04.11	11:54	대전유성우체국	도착	
2020.04.11	13:50	대전유성우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:안*철님 - 배우자)	

[Example of the missing name of the deliveryman]

기본정보 마스크 (+)복귀조회 ①계정포시제대환 근거

등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	최근구분	배달결과
1068810077888	신우영필 2020.04.10	사구선거관리위원회 2020.04.12		배달완료

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발행국	처리현황
2020.04.10	19:33	경원우체국	접수
2020.04.10	22:00	경원우체국	발송
2020.04.11	00:26	외경부우편집중국	도착
2020.04.12	00:46	외경부우편집중국	발송
2020.04.12	03:22	대전교환센터	도착
2020.04.12	04:44	대전교환센터	발송
2020.04.12	08:12	부산우편집중국	도착
2020.04.12	12:46	부산우편집중국	발송
2020.04.12	13:28	부산서상우체국	도착
2020.04.12	13:43	부산서상우체국	배달문서 접수완료
2020.04.12	15:10	부산서상우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:윤선님 - 회사동료)

deliver name error – no name: 4,511cases

2) Problems with the delivery route and time


As you can see in the illustration below, the mail-in votes that departed from Gyeongju for South Ulsan took unnecessary and impossible routes, stopping at the Daejeon exchange center and Gangneung distribution center. This can't and shouldn't have happened. It also is a significant error that their tracking history was recorded as following: "Pohang distribution center Dispatched-Dispatched, Daejeon exchange center Arrived-Arrived, Dispatched-Dispatched." One can also find where it says "Gangneung distribution center (Arrived)-Ulsan distribution center (Arrived)." The travel time between them was 08:42-09:08. It normally takes more than 3 hours to travel between them, but it only took them 26 minutes, according to the record. The distance from the Gyeongju post office to the Pohang distribution center is 29.2 kilometers, which normally takes more than 30 minutes. But it says it arrived in 10 minutes. This kind of error was possible because Chinese, who don't understand the Korean postal service system, manipulated the server. They took routes that don't make any sense.

[Unnecessary routes and transit time error]

등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	위급구분	배달결과
1068809362832	신*우연물 2020.04.10	올*군선거관리위원회 2020.04.11		배달완료

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황
2020.04.10	19:54	경주우체국	접수
2020.04.11	01:44	포항우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	01:44	포항우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	03:19	대전교환센터	도착
2020.04.11	03:19	대전교환센터	도착
2020.04.11	04:50	대전교환센터	발송
2020.04.11	04:54	대전교환센터	발송
2020.04.11	08:42	강릉우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	09:08	울산우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	09:21	경주우체국	발송
2020.04.11	09:31	포항우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	11:49	울산우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	11:53	남울산우체국	도착
2020.04.11	13:08	남울산우체국	배달준비 집배원·박상일
2020.04.11	14:06	남울산우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인·김*경남 - 회사동료)



[Shortened distance]

기본정보			
송기번호	보내는날/보내는시간	받는날/받는시간	배송구분
1068810528675	2020.04.11	2020.04.12	배달완료

배송 진행상황			
날짜	시간	발생국	제시사항
2020.04.11	20:57	부산광역시	접수
2020.04.11	21:14	부산광역시	발송
2020.04.11	21:54	경상북도경주시	도착
2020.04.12	07:34	경상북도경주시	발송
2020.04.12	08:55	경상북도경주시	도착
2020.04.12	12:33	경상북도경주시	발송
2020.04.12	12:34	경상북도경주시	도착
2020.04.12	14:25	경상북도경주시	배달완료 (예외)
2020.04.12	16:30	경상북도경주시	배달완료 (예외)

transit time error - too short: 307.826



There were 328,723 cases where the delivery route and transit time was manipulated for mail-in voting. The mail sent from Gyeongju to Incheon took the route of Gyeongju-Pohang-Daejeon-Bucheon-Gyeongju-Bucheon-Pohang-Incheon. Some mail traveled 27.8 kilometers within a minute, which normally takes around 30 to 40 minutes, according to GPS. In some cases, the mail arrived in 0 minutes for a distance that normally takes 11 minutes. Those who have just little bit of knowledge of the Korean map would see this as impossible. We can't erase the suspicions that they tried to manipulate the result from the central server without taking the characteristics of the map into account.

[Example of arriving in zero minutes for a distance that normally takes 11 minutes]

기본정보			
송기번호	보내는날/보내는시간	받는날/받는시간	배송구분
1068811292006	2020.04.11	2020.04.12	배달완료

배송 진행상황			
날짜	시간	발생국	제시사항
2020.04.11	20:25	경상북도경주시	접수
2020.04.11	21:41	경상북도경주시	발송
2020.04.11	21:41	경상북도경주시	도착
2020.04.12	01:18	경상북도경주시	발송
2020.04.12	01:18	대전광역시	도착
2020.04.12	04:10	대전광역시	발송
2020.04.12	04:21	대전광역시	도착
2020.04.12	08:02	대전광역시	발송
2020.04.12	08:09	경상북도경주시	도착
2020.04.12	10:44	경상북도경주시	배달완료 (예외)
2020.04.12	13:28	경상북도경주시	배달완료 (예외)



3) Mail with no delivery date and problems with the delivery status

[Example of no delivery date and problems with delivery status]

기본정보

등기번호	보내는분/발송일자	받는분(주소/과목)	취급구분	배달결과
1068808196402	선거우편물 2020.04.10	도봉구선거관리위원회 수신 날짜 없음		도착

no received dates

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발행국	처리현황
2020.04.10	21:12	동두천우체국	결수
2020.04.10	21:53	동두천우체국	발송
2020.04.11	00:24	의정부우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	11:08	의정부우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	12:29	서울도봉우체국	배달준비 검역 통과다중 배달일로 (비밀) 배달준비 (신규우편물 - 회사우편물)
2020.04.11	17:47	서울도봉우체국	도착

10시간 44시간소드

delivery results error - arrived

delivery results error - no received dates: 138,860 cases

delivery results error - arrived: 138,853 cases

The delivery date is very important for registered mail. But there were 138,860 cases where the delivery date was missing on the system. In 138,853 cases, the final status is not “Delivery Completed.” There were another 140,515 cases where delivery was processed after it said delivery was completed. In the case of mail-in votes, the status should be “Arrived-Dispatched-Arrived-Dispatched.” But there were 99,772 cases that say “Dispatched-Dispatched, Arrived-Arrived.” In 5,356 cases, the mail was sent without being registered. There were 30,063 cases where the mail was registered once and re-registered. In 17,683 cases, the mail was registered at a certain post office but processed at a different postal office. It can’t be possible to see mail without a delivery date, registered-canceled-reregistered, and duplicated status in normal circumstances. It appears that they made errors while manipulating a large number of shipments through the server.

[Example of Dispatched-Dispatched, Arrived-Arrived and time errors]

배송조회

국내우편(등기/택배)배송조회

기본정보

등기번호	보내는분/발송일자	받는분(주소/과목)	취급구분	배달결과
				도착

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발행국	처리현황
2020.04.11	12:29	서울도봉우체국	배달준비
2020.04.11	17:47	서울도봉우체국	도착

not 'arrived-departed' consistent status : 71,518 cases
(ex: arrived-arrived, or departure-departure)

transit time error - too short: 307,826 cases

4) Undelivered mail

The mail sent out to the governmental organizations like the NEC has a low chance of being not delivered. There were some cases where the reason for the failed delivery was because it was sent to the wrong address, the resident moved to another place or there was no one at home. Election-related mail is strictly managed mail. There is a no reason for NEC employees to be away from home or move to other places during the election period. Furthermore, the deliverymen stay alert to election-related mail all the time, so it is hard to imagine mail that was not delivered due to such reasons. There were 5 cases like this and another 4 cases where the mail was sent after the early voting process, according to the tracking history.

[Example of failed delivery]

기본정보		마스킹(*)해제조회	① 제한표시에대한 근거
등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분
1068809343597	선*우편물 2020.04.10	유*구선거관리위원회	미배달 (이사간곳발송)

배송 진행상황			
날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황
2020.04.10	19:49	논산우체국	접수
2020.04.10	22:14	논산우체국	발송
2020.04.10	23:41	대전우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	10:07	대전우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	10:14	대전둔산우체국	도착
2020.04.11	10:27	대전둔산우체국	배달준비
2020.04.11	15:55	대전둔산우체국	미배달 * 미배달 사유: 패문부제 (익일(영업일 기준)배달 예정)
2020.04.12	12:30	대전둔산우체국	발송
2020.04.12	13:13	대전유성우체국	도착
2020.04.12	13:14	대전유성우체국	배달준비 김배원:강금구
2020.04.12	13:35	대전유성우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:남 -)
2020.04.17	14:52	대전둔산우체국	미배달 * 미배달 사유: (이사간곳발송)

5) Mail sent without registration, mail sent by different postal office, mail sent on a non-early election day

It is basic common sense that the mail is first registered then sent. It is also quite obvious for the postal office who received the mail to process it. However, there were 8,354 cases of mails being sent without the registration process. In 17,368 cases, mails were sent from post offices other than the one that actually received the registration.

There were 43 cases of mail being sent on April 12, a day after the official early voting days (April 10-11). The mail sent on non-early voting days is illegal and thus invalid. There were many mail-in votes traveling from and to the Incheon post office. The office is responsible for election-related mail from the Incheon Yeonsu district election commission. There is a chance that officials at Yeonsu’s election commission were involved in a plot to manipulate mail-in votes.

All this evidence points to election fraud. If there were just one or two cases like this, it could have been dismissed as a simple mistake, error and mismanagement. (Of course, in the case of Austria, this would make the election invalid and will be ground to call for a reelection) There were tens of thousands of cases that occurred in Korea. This is beyond the margin of error and it is a significant result of the election fraud.

[Example of mail sent from a postal office that is different from where it is registered]

기본정보		마스킹(이)체제교회	☑ 제한요사제대만 근거
등록번호	보내자는별/발송일	받는별/수신일	취급구분
1068808797692	선*우편물 2020.04.10	환*시전기문리우편물 2020.04.12	

배송 진행상황			
post office – acceptance error case: 17,683			
날짜	시간	발령국	제대번호
2020.04.10	19:38	경기북부우체국	검수
2020.04.10	20:59	양평우체국	발송
2020.04.10	22:27	홍서동우편접수국	도착
2020.04.11	02:01	홍서동우편접수국	발송
2020.04.11	04:14	대건교황센터	도착
2020.04.11	04:49	대건교황센터	발송
2020.04.11	06:51	환우우편접수국	도착
2020.04.12	12:22	환우우편접수국	발송
2020.04.12	12:51	환우우체국	도착
2020.04.12	14:03	환우우체국	책임관리 감배후이상준
2020.04.12	15:47	환우우체국	책임관리 (배달) (수령인)남*영민(남 - 회사물류)

[Example of mail sent after the early voting day]

기본정보				
		마스킹(+) <small>해제조회</small>	① 제한표시에대한 근거	
등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분	배달결과
1068811244204	선*우편물 2020.04.12	연*구선거관리위원회 2020.04.13		배달완료

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황
2020.04.12	14:06	인천우체국	접수
2020.04.12	14:28	인천우체국	발송
2020.04.12	15:05	부천우편집중국	도착
2020.04.13	15:03	부천우편집중국	발송
2020.04.13	15:58	인천우체국	도착
2020.04.13	16:09	인천우체국	배달준비 집배원:최종성
2020.04.13	16:34	인천우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:오*빈님 - 회사동료)

[Example of mail sent without prior registration]

기본정보				
		마스킹(+) <small>해제조회</small>	① 제한표시에대한 근거	
등기번호	보내는분/발송날짜	받는분/수신날짜	취급구분	배달결과
1068809329848	선*우편물 2020.04.10	중*구선거관리위원회 2020.04.12		배달완료

배송 진행상황 deliver without sending process!: 8,354cases

날짜	시간	발생국	처리현황
2020.04.10	19:53	부여우체국	발송
2020.04.10	19:55	부여우체국	접수
2020.04.10	22:38	대전우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	04:43	대전우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	04:44	대전교환센터	도착
2020.04.11	04:51	대전교환센터	발송
2020.04.11	08:27	의정부우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	22:24	의정부우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	22:39	서울중앙우체국	도착
2020.04.12	09:53	서울중앙우체국	배달준비 집배원:박재열
2020.04.12	13:12	서울중앙우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인:김*영님 - 회사동료)

D. Destruction of evidence – changing servers from the post office and the integrated voter list

The NEC has failed to provide the integrated voter list yet and is destroying key evidence that is subject to verification such as the server, ballot paper printers, electronic ballot count machines and voter list. Former assembly member Min Kyung-wook and his lawyers have issued a statement pointing out the fraudulent mail-in voting. Since then, the postal office has been making changes to its digital data that is stored in the server. The NEC shut down the homepage that has data related to the election, from Sept. 29 to Oct. 4, and changed its server ahead of the recount. South Korean company SGS is responsible for changing the server and the company is known for its QR code technology. There are suspicions that they are trying to relocate and change the server to manipulate the QR code and the integrated voter list ahead of the recount. The legal team has filed lawsuits with the prosecution for violating public election law and destruction of evidence. However, many prosecution's offices are headed by those who were appointed by Moon Jae-in, and they are not investigating the cases thoroughly, except for just a few offices. Some offices concluded a disposition not to institute public action without going through a proper investigation. The Supreme Court has not only delayed the recount but also ignored the request for the preservation of evidence that aims to prevent the server from removed. It continues its dereliction of duty on this issue.

Mr. Min's statements were released on Sept. 9 and 16 of this year. Korea Post is manipulating digital records through the server, as you can see in the photos below. We have screen-captured all the tracking history of the election mail sent for this election. We will check with the system to see how they have manipulated the records. But the important thing to note is that the criminals involved in election fraud are destroying the evidence.

[Example of Korea Post manipulating the records]

기본정보

등록번호	발신지/발신일	받는지/수신일	취급구분	배달결과
136800799071	신우면동 2020.04.10	고사리읍구산거리2리10번동		배달완료

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발행국	처리현황
2020.04.10	21:08	서울서초우체국	접수
2020.04.10	22:20	서울서초우체국	발송
2020.04.10	22:53	동서울우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	04:19	동서울우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	09:16	고양우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	09:38	고양우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	10:37	고양일선우체국	도착
2020.04.11	10:53	고양일선우체국	배달준비 접대원지정
2020.04.11	18:33	고양일선우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인 김·정남 - 최사동교)

인쇄

배송문의

- 연미봉 배송 정보제공은 우편물 배달예비(배달, 피배달)를 고객에게 신속히 알려주는 것이 목적이며 모든 배송정보가 표시되지는 않으며
- 각종 피해관계의 증거자료로 사용하기 위해서는 배달준영 서비스를 이용하실 수 없습니다.
- 배송완료시간은 고객님이 실제 받으신 시기와 차이가 있을 수 있습니다.
- 조회서비스는 1년단위의 우편물만 가능합니다.
- 자세한 사항은 우체국콜센터(1588-1300)로 문의하시기 바랍니다.

기본정보

등록번호	발신지/발신일	받는지/수신일	취급구분	배달결과
136800799071	신우면동 2020.04.10	고사리읍구산거리2리10번동		배달완료

배송 진행상황

날짜	시간	발행국	처리현황
2020.04.10	21:08	서울서초우체국	접수
2020.04.10	22:20	서울서초우체국	발송
2020.04.10	22:53	동서울우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	04:19	동서울우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	09:16	고양우편집중국	도착
2020.04.11	09:38	고양우편집중국	발송
2020.04.11	10:37	고양일선우체국	도착
2020.04.11	10:53	고양일선우체국	배달준비 접대원지정
2020.04.11	18:33	고양일선우체국	배달완료 (배달) (수령인 김·정남 - 최사동교)

인쇄

배송문의

- 연미봉 배송 정보제공은 우편물 배달예비(배달, 피배달)를 고객에게 신속히 알려주는 것이 목적이며 모든 배송정보가 표시되지는 않으며
- 각종 피해관계의 증거자료로 사용하기 위해서는 배달준영 서비스를 이용하실 수 없습니다.
- 배송완료시간은 고객님이 실제 받으신 시기와 차이가 있을 수 있습니다.
- 조회서비스는 1년단위의 우편물만 가능합니다.
- 자세한 사항은 우체국콜센터(1588-1300)로 문의하시기 바랍니다.

Recipient manipulation

[NEC's announcement on the temporary shutdown of its website]



[Bidding information for the server relocation]

[입찰 결과]								
입찰광고번호	20200722621-00	광고상태	완료	참조번호	12208185801			
광고명	신규 전산센터 이전 사업	공고기관	중앙선거관리위원회	수요기관	중앙선거관리위원회			
공고담당자	김효석 (070-4056-8996)	입찰담당자	김효석	실제개찰일시	2020/07/24 12:58	적격심사결과		
유의사항	□ 시간단절 과정에서 부가격 차등 중 입찰의 무효금액과 무효율은 표시되지 않습니다. 판정관련 문의는 해당 공고의 입찰접합관에게 문의하시기 바랍니다.							
[개찰순위] ※ 사업자등록번호 <input type="text"/> <input type="button" value="검색"/> [참여 업체수: 1 개사]								
순위	사업자등록번호	업체명	대표자	투표금액(원)	투표율(%)	주점번호	투표일시	비고
1	1028152385	에스지아이 주식회사	문유진	892,000,000	100.000			
[입찰 결과]								
입찰광고번호	20200816900-00	광고상태	완료	참조번호	12208196301			
광고명	중앙선거관리위원회 구축 사업(역스)	공고기관	중앙선거관리위원회	수요기관	중앙선거관리위원회			
공고담당자	최태순 (02-2291-1830)	입찰담당자	최태순	실제개찰일시	2020/08/26 17:09	적격심사결과		
유의사항	□ 시간단절 과정에서 부가격 차등 중 입찰의 무효금액과 무효율은 표시되지 않습니다. 판정관련 문의는 해당 공고의 입찰접합관에게 문의하시기 바랍니다.							
[개찰순위] ※ 사업자등록번호 <input type="text"/> <input type="button" value="검색"/> [참여 업체수: 1 개사]								
순위	사업자등록번호	업체명	대표자	투표금액(원)	투표율(%)	주점번호	투표일시	비고
1	1028152385	에스지아이 주식회사	문유진	694,500,000	99.899			

The NEC relocated its server at Gwanak Government Complex to Gwancheon Government Complex at 3 am on Sept. 30, which was the first day of the Korean Chuseok holiday. The server had all the information related to the April 15 general election. There are 125 lawsuits filed with the Supreme Court requesting the invalidation of the election and preservation of evidence of the

server. Even with all these efforts, the NEC's server was damaged, with the involvement of a large number of policemen early in the morning on a holiday, like a commando operation.

The legal team submitted a total of 7 documents for the preliminary plea. It has briefed the court in depth that digital manipulation was the key to the April 15 election fraud and on the argument behind invalidating the election. The team also requested the preservation and investigation of evidences at the same time. In June, the legal team requested the appraisal of the server and digital devices used in the election and requested related documents be provided. However, the NEC has not provided anything requested except for a four-page written opinion. The court dismissed the request for the preservation of evidence on the server, the digital devices used in the election and its records. It also dismissed the appeals that the legal team filed. The legal team also requested the preservation of evidence through civil law, but it was dismissed again. The team's appeal was dismissed, and it appealed again to the court. Now the Supreme Court is sitting on the issue.

It was not until mid-September, when the legal deadline was about a month away, that the Supreme Court issued an order to prepare for a further explanation. The NEC announced that it would relocate its digital center and started the bidding process publicly from Sept. 29 to Oct. 4. In its preparatory document sent to the court on Sept. 24, the NEC said that the appraisal process for the server and other related data should take place at the Gwacheon Government Complex once the digital center is relocated and installed completely.

After reviewing the announcement and preparatory document, the legal team immediately submitted a request for the emergency preservation of evidence contained on the actual server to be left untouched, since it has all the election-related records and data for the Supreme Court. As the movement to relocate the server at the Gwankak site became visible, the team repeatedly submitted additional preparatory documents on Sept. 28 and 29 to urge the court to prevent damage to the server and four applications requesting that the court set up a hearing

However, the Supreme Court remained silent and unresponsive to the desperate demands of the legal team. The NEC conducted a shutdown to block access to its website at 6 pm on Sept. 29. Soon after, at around 5:30 am on Sept. 30, it dismantled the server at the Gwacheon Government Complex, which contains all the records of the 21st general election, and moved it to the Gwacheon Government Complex. The company in charge of the data transfer project was the company known for its QR code-related technology. The company was the one the legal team pointed out as being at the core of the illegal manipulation and the key area to be appraised.

For the past five and a half months since the election, the server containing all the election records was under the control of the NEC. It is hard to completely rule out the possibility that the authenticity, integrity and reliability of the records have already been damaged during this period. Furthermore, the NEC, which is responsible for resolving the allegations of illegal damage done to the server, has in fact committed to completely destroy the server's current state. The server had to remain untouched in order to resolve all the allegations.

"Those affected by the relocation of the data center will have nothing to do with the election records," the NEC explained. However, this can only be considered to be false when looking at

its preparatory statement submitted on Sept. 24, which said that the appraisal process needs to be conducted at Gwacheon Government Complex once the relocation of the digital center is completed.

In the 20th general election, 19th presidential election and 2018 regional election, they conducted a project to preserve log files used for devices operating the election information system. However, they haven't done so in this election, so one can't be sure whether the log file has been properly preserved. The legal team requested forensics on the server log records, which could be the key to finding out whether early voting was legitimately processed. The NEC, however, ignored the request for four months and issued a press release saying the "original server will not be relocated" without announcing its plans to move the whole server. This wording in the press release misled the people. They took out the server in a way where it cannot be confidently said that the data is as it was originally.

Currently, the NEC announced that it will hire a contractor to make readjustments to rules and standards regarding the issuance of individual codes from the integrated voter list system. They called the project the "Integrated voter list system data quality control consulting project" and said the project will be carried out until the last day of this year once the contractor is selected. The legal team has called for a verification process to see whether the early voting process was properly conducted by comparing various records such as log files and the history of QR code issuance from the integrated voter list. But the move by the NEC clearly shows that it is dismissing our requests by making all the records not useful for this purpose.

Reasonable concerns are being raised that the election-related records are more vulnerable to manipulation, covering up and destruction of evidence during the period of the NEC's website shutdown from 6 pm on Sept. 2 to Oct. 4. In addition, there are serious concerns that large-scale work under the pretext of the relocation of the data center from the Gwanak office to Gwacheon could actually result in a large number of covert deletions, alterations and omissions of election-related records.

Most of all, the electronic records related to the election, which should have been preserved as they were at the time election ended, were left defenseless for five and a half months. They said they planned for the relocation work in advance, or in January of this year, but they never publicly announced this plan in the past five months when the lawsuits calling the election invalid were filed. Also, it has now become difficult to recover even the traces of the damage done to the integrity of the digital evidence. They also hired a contractor for the project related to the issue that the legal team pointed out as key evidence needed for the verification process. Due to these facts, many are raising reasonable concerns that the Supreme Court is a de facto accomplice abetting the destruction of evidence.

The act of brutally damaging the evidence that was conducted on Sept. 30 is an act that permanently damaged the only method to verify the authenticity, integrity and reliability of the server, which is they key evidence for the election invalidity lawsuit. This is a typical act of obstruction affecting the legal principles of the lawsuit. The NEC itself admitted to the legitimacy behind arguing over the illegal and manipulated election fraud and the existence of reasons to call it an invalid election. The court can consider that the arguments for the

nullification of election are proven just by looking at the acts of destruction of conclusive evidence, obstruction of proof and the effects resulting from these acts. It can call the election invalid once these arguments are proven right by looking at these facts.

Strong protests from the citizens over the NEC's server-damaging measures have been left as physical evidence. During the server relocation process, an NEC employee was spotted scanning a large amount of data, which is thought to have included documents with QR codes. This was done while the network was shut down. Four non-violent citizens were arrested by the police during their desperate protest to block the server relocation with their bare bodies.

The scale of the external pressure on domestic efforts is beyond imagination when considering the fact that the election fraud committed nationwide determines the fate of the ruling party. It also is reasonable to believe that it would not be possible to reveal the truth just through domestic experts' investigation, given the fact that the government is damaging servers and destroying evidence, which fundamentally destroys the principle of legal procedure under the constitution.

Therefore, it becomes more necessary for an international investigation team consisting of international experts to conduct a thorough investigation of election-related electronic devices, such as the server and the electronic records. If the NEC rejects the appraisal by the international investigation team, or the team finds the damage or destruction of election-related electronic devices such as the server and other records, the Supreme Court will have no other choice but to officially declare the April 15 election null and void.

5. Conclusion

Significant fraud and illegal activities in all likelihood were committed in the April 15 election. In Korea, a group called "The April 15 Peoples' Fight Against Rigged Elections Headquarters," headed by Min Kyung-wook, was organized. Effectively working on behalf of all citizens, it is spreading the truth behind the April 15 election fraud through various measures, such as people protesting alone and wearing black clothes in rallies. However, the Moon administration and the ruling party have charged Min with a crime through the police, imprisoned a whistleblower who gave election fraud-related information to a National Assembly member through the prosecution, and is shutting people's mouths by banning rallies, citing the coronavirus.

They are blocking the publication of reports covering the April 15 election fraud. They are issuing arrest warrants for violating the laws on assembly for those who already gained the permission to hold assemblies. This is to stop people from holding further rallies. This also clearly does not even constitute a reason for issuing a warrant. They are taking advantage of judges who are on their side. The persecution against people is becoming more severe.

Article 1, Section 2, of the South Korean Constitution clearly states that "the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall reside in the people, and all state authority shall emanate from the people." The sovereignty of the country, sacred and dignified, has been seriously damaged and violated due to the April 15 election fraud. The April 15 election fraud that happened in Korea is not just Korea's problem. We are living in the era of the 2020 pandemic, where the world is

suffering from the coronavirus, which can happen anywhere in the world. The sort of fraud and misconduct that happened in the South Korean can happen anywhere. Please let the world know of the irregularities and likely fraud in the April 15 election in Korea, and please help us protect our electoral system that is the foundation of our democracy.

2020. 10. 5.

Attorney Park Ju-hyun from Korea